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Abstract 
To offer the best possible care for their 
patients, family physicians need coordinated 
data obtained from the physicians own patient 
database, from other physicians database, 
pharmacies, and drug reference databases. 
P2P-based sharing systems have been actively 
researched to enable resource sharing between 
multiple heterogeneous healthcare enterprises. 
Unfortunately, P2P system introduces a whole 
new class of privacy and security threats and 
in order to enable resource sharing between 
multiple heterogeneous healthcare enterprises, 
a policy management framework is required. 
To solve these problems in a loose-coupling 
way, we propose a dynamic, distributed and 
heterogeneous policy management framework 
for sharing medical information among 
autonomous and disparate healthcare 
information systems. 
Keywords: Healthcare system, privacy, 
security, authorization, authentication, policy, 
P2P. 
1 Introduction 
Although, healthcare is one of the few 
domains where sharing information is the 
norm rather than the exception [4], the 
localization and access to electronic 
patient records across healthcare enterprise 
boundaries have remained an important 
and challenging problem. The recent 
advent of middleware technologies such as 
peer-to-peer (P2P) systems are capable of 
enabling sharing electronic health record 
across autonomously managed 
heterogeneous healthcare information 
systems across different healthcare 
enterprises despite the fact that they may 
be dispersed throughout the world, and 
that they may not know each other 
personally. As a result, a flurry of peer-to-
peer (P2P) based systems for distributed 
healthcare data sharing have been 
emerging recently. For example, under the 
assumption that the healthcare providers 
form a Gnutella-like P2P community, an 
ontology-based P2P approach for 
facilitating heterogeneous medical 
information sharing between healthcare 
providers is proposed in [5]. Also, an 
approach that loosely couples multi-agent 
and peer-to-peer technologies for 
facilitating patient and clinical data 
sharing between healthcare providers have 
been discussed in [8].  
Although there is a merit for easy 
accessibility of individual's health 
information by qualified and authorized 
individuals, this could vastly increase the 
potential for abuse of that information. In 
general, health and medical information 
are highly confidential and sensitive. 
Therefore, privacy, confidentiality and 
security are essential components of the 
health record and of fostering trust 
between healthcare consumers and 
providers. However, increasing 
automation of the electronic medical 
record presents, among others, significant 
patient privacy and confidentiality issues 
that could expose the healthcare providers 
and users to liability. Therefore, in 
addition to being confidential, such 
systems must maintain a certain level of 
safety and security. While it is important 
that a way to allow authorized individuals 
have access to the necessary information 
to do their job the best way, we must also 
examine potential security threats and how 
to prevent and protect the confidential 
information and privacy-sensitive data. 
To enable resource sharing between 
multiple heterogeneous healthcare 
enterprises, an authorization policy 
management framework is required. To 
solve these problems in a loose-coupling 
way, we propose a dynamic, distributed 
and heterogeneous authorization policy 
management framework for sharing 
medical information among autonomous 
and disparate healthcare information 
systems. An approach for mediating 
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between security and privacy policies is 
also described. 
The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows: In Section 2, we outline a number 
of security issues that are characteristic of 
P2P data sharing systems with emphases 
on healthcare information systems. The 
proposed framework is then presented in 
Section 3. The conclusion and future work 
is discussed in Section 4. 
2 Privacy and Security Issues 
P2P systems allow any user to share 
resources while maintaining the autonomy 
and independence from the centralized 
servers. Thus they usually have better 
availability and fault tolerance than the 
traditional client-server based systems. 
However, P2P systems are prone to 
potentially serious privacy and security 
risks that may come from their use or 
misuse. P2P systems make it possible, and 
in some cases too easy, for people to share 
personal data (i.e., inadvertent sharing of 
sensitive information); (2) Data trading 
introduces risks similar to those faced by 
Internet users generally (i.e., Security 
concerns); and (3) File traders who violate 
copyright laws face obvious legal risks 
(i.e., Legal risks). Although security is a 
paramount concern in any networked 
systems, the need for privacy, 
confidentiality and security protection 
takes on new meanings in healthcare 
information systems. Also, healthcare 
information systems operate within a strict 
regulatory framework that is enforced to 
ensure the protection of personal data 
against processing and outlines conditions 
and rules in which processing is allowed. 
Therefore, middleware systems that 
facilitate clinical data sharing must abide 
by the strictest conditions of 
confidentiality that not only meet but also 
often exceed approved privacy standards 
and regulations. Therefore, sharing highly 
confidential information and privacy-
sensitive data in P2P fashion is extremely 
challenging. In P2P environment, 
mechanisms by which a patient's right to 
confidentiality and privacy is maintained 
and respected is an important component 
of the healthcare information systems.  
Securely transferring data between 
different parts of a healthcare system is 
one of the biggest single problems in 
healthcare information systems. Securing 
P2P data sharing applications is 
challenging due to their open and 
autonomous nature. Compared to a client-
server system in which servers can be 
relied upon or trusted to always follow 
protocols, peers in a P2P system may 
provide no such guarantee. The 
environment in which a peer must function 
is a hostile one in which any peer is 
welcome to join the network; these peers 
cannot necessarily be trusted to route 
queries or responses correctly, store 
documents when asked to, or serve 
documents when requested.  
Unless proper protection is in place, the 
possibility of introducing and spreading a 
Trojan horse or virus becomes as easy as 
sending an e-mail. It may be reasonable to 
trust a single centralized service, but 
obviously unwise to trust any multitude of 
anonymous resource-providers in the 
whole P2P network. Therefore, it is 
important to identify the authenticity of 
the resources offered by other peers. For 
example, P2P systems can be exploited to 
distribute malicious software, such as 
viruses and Trojan horses, even bypassing 
the protections of firewalls. Therefore, a 
malicious peer can easily deceive other 
peers, and hackers as well as worm virus 
can use spoofed identity to damage the 
whole P2P system. 
Even if not taking the security threats into 
count, due to the lack of assured 
authenticity of the resources to be 
exchanged, the overall performance of 
P2P systems degrades severely for much 
time and bandwidth is wasted in 
downloading unwanted files. The main 
difference between this case and music 
sharing is that the reliability of the 
information to be exchanged could be 
critical, and cannot always be judged 
simply by reading it. Moreover, some 
people, like representative of drug 
companies, may have vested interest to 
provide false treatment advice to promote 
their drug. Trust is essential if the health 
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information collected is to serve as a 
complete and accurate foundation not only 
for patient health information but also for 
clinical care, research, payment, and 
healthcare policymaking.  
3 Policy Framework 
Architecture
In this section, we propose a policy for 
governing medical data sharing in 
decentralized P2P environments. 
Generally speaking, the purpose of such a 
policy is (a) to provide for effective 
coordination between members of the 
community, and (b) to ensure the security 
of community members, and of the 
information they share with each other. To 
achieve these purposes, the policy might 
impose constraints on both the 
membership of the community and on the 
behavior of its members when they are 
interacting with each other—all these in a 
highly application dependent manner. We 
now describe the main component of the 
system shown in Fig. 1 in more detail. Due 
to space limitation, we will elaborate on 
the exact mechanism for maintaining this 
reputation later in the extended version of 
the paper. 
3.1 System Architecture 
Fig.1. shows a network of peer database 
systems of family doctors, hospitals, 
medical laboratories, and pharmacists that 
are willing to share patient information 
about diagnosis, treatments and 
medications. We refer to this infrastructure 
as healthcare provider community (HPC). 
Each healthcare provider operates 
autonomously within distinct domain and 
has different healthcare information 
systems to support local patient care.  
Fig. 1: A network of peer database 
systems of family doctors, hospitals, 
medical laboratories, and pharmacist.
Each healthcare system maintains a patient 
database along with policy, reputation on 
other peers and credential information. 
The patient database maintains patient 
personal data (i.e., about diagnosis, 
treatments, medications, etc.). As the 
custodian of patient information, each 
healthcare provider is responsible for 
protecting patient information in patient 
database against unauthorised use.   
While the P2P domain might seem exciting 
and promising, measures of trust and security 
must be applied to each peer to establish a 
secure connection for secure computing in 
such a distributed environment. Firstly, the 
connection between peers must be secure, 
which requires at least the capability of each 
peer to identify the other participant in the 
connection. Secondly, the sensitive data 
managed or exchanged via applications must 
be protected. The trust and security properties 
are established by using various techniques 
such as authentication of peers communicating 
with each other or with any other entity 
involved in the P2P application, authorization 
of certain entities to do some action or access 
some information, encryption of sensitive 
information flowing between peers over an 
unsecured network.  
3.2 Certification Process 
Sophisticated security mechanisms rely on 
the use of credentials (also called 
certificates, tokens, or assertions). In order 
to properly utilize credentials, mechanisms 
must be in place to issue, validate, and 
revoke them. In a service-oriented setting, 
these mechanisms are provided by 
specialized services. 
There are several certification authorities 
(e.g., CA1) in the system providing 
credentials (also known as certificate, 
tokens, or assertions) to the peers for the 
purpose of correctly authenticating 
themselves with. We assume that the CAs 
also store detailed information on each 
peer in the community including the 
address, phone number business 
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registration number. This information 
could be used, if need be, to establish the 
identity of the caller (such as by calling 
back to a number in the CAs), and to 
always notify the patient. The CAs also 
ensures proper utilization of the 
credentials by regularly validating and 
revoking credentials them. 
The healthcare providers (i.e., peer) join 
HPC community with the objectives to be 
able to share and have access to remote 
data obtained from other physicians’ 
database, pharmacies, and drug reference 
databases to offer the best possible care for 
their patients. Membership to the HPC 
data sharing community is controlled and 
certified by CA1 certification authority. In 
our system, membership to the data 
sharing community is controlled and 
certified by CA1 certification authority 
while the second certification authority 
(CA2) represents the medical board and 
responsible for certifying medical doctors 
in good standing. We assume that these 
CAs ensure that there are no ways for 
peers to request certificates for other 
people or multiple certificates for the same 
peer.
Once a submitted certificate is verified, its 
validity is to be monitored as follows: 
certificates issued by CA1 are to be 
checked for validity every day, while 
certificates issued by CA2 should be 
checked every 30 days. This difference in 
frequencies reflects different expectation 
about the stability of the certificates issued 
by the two authorities. 
3.3 Membership Maintenance 
One way to enhance the trustworthiness of 
the information exchanged is to limit the 
membership in the community to 
trustworthy people, however this may be 
defined. While the set of criteria for 
admission and removal can be arbitrarily 
complex, the sensitive nature of the 
information to be shared dictates three 
fundamental concerns for HPC 
community: (i) members should be doctors, 
(ii) members should have some level of 
trust in each other, and (iii) if a member 
misbehaves, it must be possible to revoke 
peers membership.  
Therefore, HPC membership is controlled 
such that a peer will be allowed to join the 
HPC community if the peer is a medical 
doctor as certified by CA2 and the peer 
either is one of the founders of this 
community as certified by CA1 or is 
recommended by at least two current 
members of HPC community in good 
standing. Note that certification from CA1
will only be given to a peer provided that 
the healthcare providers system meets or 
exceeds the state and federal regulations 
governing the health care industry. 
We attempt to discourage inappropriate 
use of the system, by punishing users who 
misbehave as well as by placing limit on 
the number of queries individual peer will 
submit per day. A regular member is 
removed from this community if three 
different members vote for the peers’ 
removal. We regulate the rate of queries in 
such a way that every query has a cost, 
which must be paid for from the budget of 
the peer presenting it. 
3.4 Reputation Management 
Usually the healthcare providers don’t 
have any pre-existing relationship and may 
reside in different security domains. 
Therefore, trust is essential if the health 
information collected is to serve as a 
complete and accurate foundation. In this 
context, the reliability of the information 
to be exchanged is typically critical. 
However, the reliability of the information 
cannot always be judged simply by 
reading it. Moreover, the system could be 
abused, like representative of drug 
companies, may have vested interest to 
provide false treatment advice to promote 
their drug. Therefore, building trust 
relationship between healthcare providers 
in a large-scale distributed system is a 
fundamental and challenging research 
topic.
We use a simple yet general reputation 
system to help members in assessing the 
reliability of information provided by each 
others. Each peer must maintain a 
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reputation value that summarizes other 
members’ feedback on the quality of their 
responses to posted queries. Further, this 
reputation must be presented along with 
every response to a query. Each member 
of a HPC has a numeric reputation in the 
range of MIN to MAX, which is attached to 
every query-hit message so that the querier 
can decide whether to trust the answer or 
not. In the framework, larger numeric 
reputation values imply greater trust. 
The protocol is as follows: (1) each 
member starts with a reputation of 0 when 
it first joins the community; (2) whenever 
a member receives a query-hit message 
from a peer, it is allowed to rate the 
quality of the answer given by that peer; 
(3) this rating can range from í1 to 1 and 
is simply added to the peer’s reputation.; 
(4) a member is allowed to make only one 
rating per answering peer per query. 
Further, this reputation must be presented 
along with every response to a query.  
3.5 Policy Management 
Typically, a healthcare provider 
implements the legislation by authoring a 
security policy that mandates working 
practices and security technology 
requirements. A security policy is a set of 
rules for authorization, access control, and 
trust in a certain domain; it can also 
contain information about some users’ 
roles and the abilities associated with 
those roles. For example, healthcare providers 
could define privacy policies that state which 
healthcare professionals are able to access 
specific medical data. Fig. 2 shows the 
components of security policy in the proposed 
framework. 
Fig. 2: Security policy and brokerage 
architecture.
The physician-patient relationship is 
confidential and typically, healthcare providers 
have different security policies that state a 
diverse set of security requirements and 
capabilities. Also, in practice, peers may have 
different security requirements and capabilities. 
Similarly, authentication and authorization 
mechanisms for healthcare professions may 
also be different. To address this issues, we use 
security agents (i.e., security brokers) as 
depicted in Fig. 2. Each domain has security 
agents that enforce the policy. Security agents’ 
reason about these signed assertions and the 
appropriate security policies to provide access 
control to services in their domain. 
In addition to specifying security policies, 
healthcare providers need to restrict access 
to medical data to only authorized 
healthcare professionals. In addition to 
specifying security policies, healthcare 
providers need to restrict access to medical 
data to only authorized healthcare 
professionals.  The commonly used 
approach, role-based authorization, is 
insufficient to model access restrictions in 
all but simple healthcare scenarios. We use 
workflow context access control, where 
authorization decisions are based on the 
healthcare professional and the context in 
which they are accessing data. 
4 Conclusion and Future 
Directions
Although there is a merit for using P2P 
to ease accessibility of individual's 
health information by qualified and 
authorized individuals, this could 
vastly increase the potential for abuse 
of that information. To address this 
problem, we proposed a dynamic, 
distributed and heterogeneous policy 
management framework for sharing 
medical information among autonomous 
and disparate healthcare information 
systems in P2P environments.  
We are currently in a process of 
implementing and studying its 
performance. We are also looking into an 
approach that allows a healthcare provider 
to develop role ontology that defines the 
clinical occupations for healthcare 
professionals within their organization. 
These roles are then attached to concepts 
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in the clinical concept ontology. As 
medical data is described using the clinical 
concepts, authorization is enforced based 
on the role of the healthcare professional 
and the clinical concept being accessed.  
We are also exploring WS-SecurityPolicy 
[12] based approaches.
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